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ISSUES IN DEVELOPING THE PRACTICE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION IN OHIO:
A MINI-SYMPOSIUM
FORWORD
This mini-symposium on Issues in Developing the Practice of En-
vironmental Mediation in Ohio is the result of a panel discussion
which occurred at The Ohio Dispute Resolution Conference in April
1985. The object of this panel was to discuss the possibility of im-
plementing environmental mediation in Ohio and the issues which
arise in connection with this type of mediation.
Four individuals made presentations: Dr. Richard Collins, Direc-
tor of the Institute for Environmental Negotiation; The Honorable
Howard Bellman, Secretary for Labor, Industry, and Human Rela-
tions, State of Wisconsin; David O'Connor, Executive Director of
the Office of Mediation Services, State of Massachusetts; and Prof.
Keith Hawkins, Fellow of Wolfson College, Oxford University, United
Kingdom.
The three reactors to these presentations were: Virginia Aveny,
Deputy Director, Ohio Environmental Protection Agency; David
Hartley, State Representative in the Ohio State Legislature; and
Peter Procario, President of the Ohio Environmental Council.
(MODERATOR)
The Gund Foundation has made it possible for us to have this
panel discussion because of its interest in establishing the prac-
tice of environmental dispute resolution in Ohio. The format for
today is to discuss this issue, and if necessary, to continue the
discussion beyond the time allotted for this panel. I intend to have
a brief break for those of you who want to leave and go to another
panel discussion but the rest of us can stay and continue the
discussion.
I think we have a stellar panel to serve as our resource people
and an equally stellar group to respond to what the resource peo-
ple have suggested as ways to establish environmental mediation
in Ohio. Essentially, the resource people are going to take about
10 minutes each to lay out their perspective on what are the con-
siderations when trying to establish environmental dispute resolu-
tion in Ohio. I will then call on the people who work in Ohio to give
their reactions to what has been said, and then the audience can
raise any questions it has.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(DAVID O'CONNOR)
I want to thank the Kettering Foundation and the Gund Foun-
dation for inviting me here today. The Massachusetts Mediation
Service is a new state agency and I am its first Executive Director.
As a result, I am not going to be so presumptuous as to think that
I have advice to give Ohio about what it ought to do regarding a
state agency. But I am beginning to find out what might help
Massachusetts in this regard. I hope some of my thoughts will be
of interest and perhaps be usefully challenged. Some discussion
will reveal the many questions that remain for this type of
undertaking.
First, let me discuss how I became an environmental mediator.
My history parallels the development of the field. In 1976, I was
working as a research assistant for a small, nonprofit firm in Boston
and found myself, quite by accident, in the middle of a large dispute
concerning the conversion of a major power plant from oil to coal.
The issue was whether the power plant would have to install
scrubbers. I knew very little about the technology, finances and
environmental regulations concerning such a conversion, but sens-
ed that a plan for conversion could not be agreed upon because
the parties distrusted and did not understand one another. I in-
vited them to meet and talk to one another at our offices, and they
accepted.
At the same time, I began to learn about mediation. I completed
an American Arbitration Association training program that involv-
ed the theory and practice of mediation.
The successful resolution of that first case spurred me to attempt
to mediate other disputes. For a few years I mediated disputes as
a solo practitioner in New England and then helped organize a non-
profit environmental mediation center. Over a period of five years,
I was involved as a mediator in disputes over the construction and
operation of hydro-electric facilities, widening of highways,
establishment of air quality standards for industrial facilities, and
rate setting, as well as other public problems related to such quality
of life issues as rent control disputes and the expansion of large
institutions-such as hospitals and schools-and their impact on
neighborhoods.
It gradually became clear that the practice of environmental
mediation occurred in a very haphazard fashion and because of
the persistence of committed individuals. However, it lacked any
kind of systematic or organized method of connecting disputing
parties with mediators. Other groups and individuals, in particular
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the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, were also concern-
ed about this problem.
The National Institute wanted to test the theory that mediation
offices in state governments might be in a position to help bring
disputing parties together with mediators. The Institute offered
modest grants to states that would set up such offices and selected
four states to receive grants: Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Alaska,
and New Jersey. Each of these states is at one stage or another
of organizing a state office of mediation. New Jersey is probably
the most advanced. Massachusetts is only starting.
Is there merit to the theory that a state office will help the prac-
tice of environmental mediation? My experience as a mediator sug-
gests that it would. There is a great need to legitimize mediation
and other forms of alternative dispute resolution in nonlabor areas.
A mediator is in an awkward position to do this because parties
are skeptical of mediators promoting their own services. An entity
that endorses, explains, and promotes mediation would perform
a substantial service for private mediators. It would also be helpful
to disputing parties to have an entity providing them with more
extensive and consistent information about mediation: what it is,
where it has worked, where it has not worked.
The Massachusetts agency which will provide the services dis-
cussed above is located in the Executive Office for Administration
and Finance. To the extent that it is possible to do so, this office
provides a neutral location in government for the Mediation Ser-
vice. Over the next couple of years we will have to see whether
this is the best place in government for the agency to be located.
The major question is whether the location maximizes the agency's
credibility and acceptability to those whom it would serve.
I suppose there is some question whether hiring a former medi-
ator to organize this agency is a wise decision. I have experience
in mediation but I am a newcomer to government. Someone who
has had experience inside state government would have an advan-
tage. However, I think the major responsibility for the agency will
be in identifying cases that have the most promise for mediation.
Assessing whether an environmental or public policy dispute is
right for mediation is a difficult and time-consuming business.
Someone who has not evaluated cases for their mediation poten-
tial might find such work difficult.
Many disputes find their way through state agencies to the at-
torney general's office. I expect a portion of our work will be refer-
rals from the attorney general's office. With respect to disputes that
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involve private parties, I think the agency should help parties take
advantage of the available pool of private mediators. The demand
for this sort of service is not great at the moment, and therefore
it would be illogical to staff a number of mediators. The private
sector will do an adequate job of correlating supply with demand.
The agency will assemble a roster of mediators that could be avail-
able to assist parties who have disputes.
Another service the agency could provide is in the area of pro-
cedural reform. In regulating, permitting, or adjudicating areas,
procedural innovations can be created that formally establish a
mediation step as a routine matter. Current laws and regulations
may implicitly provide for mediation, but do not do so explicitly.
Systemic reform in these areas is an important activity in which
an agency of this kind might engage, and which might be helpful
to disputing parties and other agencies.
Finally, since the agency will rely heavily on private practitioners
for actual mediation, it might be able to develop funding to pro-
vide financial assistance in instances in which parties want to use
private mediators and cannot afford the total cost.
There is a theory that an agency like the Mediation Service will
maximize or expand the available funding for mediation and its
related activities. I am unsure of this proposition. It is now funded
by a combination of foundation and state funds. I believe that the
agency should be funded entirely by the state government, although
actual mediations should in most instances be funded by the
parties. But whether funding through this agency will ever be avail-
able for the practice of mediation or whether it will only provide
for the administration of mediation services has not yet been
determined.
The agency was created by the interest of one state cabinet
secretary and the National Institute for Dispute Resolution. As a
result, it does not yet have a constituency or base of support within
the state administration from which to work. State agencies and
other parties who might use the office need to participate actively
in the formation of its policies and procedures. We are now form-
ing a Board of Advisors which will play an important role in this
respect.
Those are the ideas I have so far developed. I am interested in
hearing comments on any point you found provocative.
(MODERATOR)
I think that was an interesting discourse from someone who has
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established a state office. Some of the considerations Dave raised
are the same kind of questions that we need to ask ourselves in
Ohio. Now, Howard Bellman brings a slightly different perspective.
(HOWARD BELLMAN)
My comments contrast with, and perhaps add to, the comments
made by David O'Connor. While ten minutes is a bit of a challenge
to explain everything I have been doing for the last eight or nine
years, advising an entire state seems like a wonderful opportu-
nity. What I am going to do is to mention a few things that strike
me as words of wisdom for your judgment.
One thing of which I am absolutely convinced is the efficacy of
environmental mediation. Now while I define "environmental"
issues very broadly, I define "mediation" very rigorously. Media-
tion requires parties who agree to sit down at a table, possessed
with priorities, and bargain, propose and compromise. One can-
not tell me that any process which resolves disputes is mediation
just as one cannot paint something green and call it grass.
I also believe that environmental mediation is appropriate for
Ohio. A few years ago I was trying to sell the idea of mediation to
the Ohio EPA and received an apathetic response. However, I do
believe that Ohio is ready for it.
It is important, however, to apply mediation selectively. Media-
tion is not here to replace anything on a global scale. Mediation
is to be used when the parties want to use it and should not be
forced on the parties. But this creates an uncertainty in the de-
mand for mediation. Therefore, if an agency were created which
served an uncertain demand, two risks are encountered. One, the
agency may force a negative mediation experience on parties. Sec-
ond, the agency may over-promise results. These risks defame the
process.
The criticism leveled against over-promising is an enlightened
criticism. The millenium will not occur if the mediation process
is adopted. Mediation will not result in the elimination of power
and political advantage. These results should not be promised.
Mediation should be offered as an alternative to other dispute
resolution procedures, but one that has its own limitations.
Creating an agency with an uncertain demand also pressures the
agency to redefine results in order to present an annual report
which shows how much work was done for the budget allocated.
It does not matter if the agency's funding comes from a founda-
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tion or legislation because it must still report. Reporting requires
counting settlement cases. This results in redefining what is a set-
tlement and what is a case. For instance, someone will call 400
people on the phone, and then will say 400 people were contacted.
These contacts become 400 cases. Then, by dividing the budget
by the 400 cases, the agency indicates how inexpensive a process
this is per case. However, the original phone contacts may or may
not have led to good resolutions or any resolutions. In sum, one
must be careful in defining the mediation process.
What I propose to this state is to stage the whole process in terms
of Ohio's interests and in the interests of public policy. I would sug-
gest that government leaders forcefully encourage their agencies
to engage in meaningful mediation. The agencies should publicize
that they are encouraging mediation and individuals should know
they get points from leaders for resolving conflicts in this way. The
state might try to marshal a combination of state and private fund-
ing for the support of this type of mediation. Then a separate agency
might be created if and when a sufficient case load develops.
The funding should not reside with an agency, such as the EPA,
that is a party to the conflicts. The money should be placed in the
Department of Administration or the Governor's Office; an office
in which the substantive responsibilities are subordinate to the staff
level responsibilities. It is also important to keep the appropriate
data over a sufficient period of time to become familiar with the
types of cases introduced into the process and the resolutions of
these cases that have resulted. The state should also train people,
as a matter of policy, to be negotiators. There are sufficient
mediators, but people need to be trained as negotiators to know
when mediators are needed.
I also suggest separating environmental mediation from court
diversion processes that attempt to relieve the burden on court
dockets. Mediation is not a court diversion process; it is a dispute
resolution process which attempts to resolve parties' disputes and
not relieve a court docket. Also, court diversion programs require
a high volume of cases to be successful. As I have indicated, a high
number of "cases" does not indicate a mediation program's suc-
cess. Success in a mediation program means that the terms upon
which a conflict is resolved are superior to the terms upon which
the conflict would have been resolved by orthodox processes.
Also, do not locate mediators in the state offices in which the
cases will be handled. In such a situation, effective neutral media-
tion will not occur because a party to the dispute will be supply-
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ing the mediator. The mediator should be procured from a source
outside state agencies. The bottom line is that the mediator must
be someone whom the parties want to mediate their dispute. This
person is then anointed with effectiveness by the self-fulfilling pro-
phesies of the parties. While a mediator may be selected by the
parties because of the mediator's experience, it may also be sim-
ply the mediator's personal effectiveness that is attractive to the
parties.
Finally, let me conclude with the thought that an Ohio process
of mediation may not be necessary. At least consider why Ohio
requires its own process. Why cannot Ohio use mediators and pro-
cesses from other states?
However, one factor in Ohio which may spur a distinct media-
tion practice is its urbanization. While those from the East may
not see it as such, those from the West recognize that mediation
requires an "urban insight" available in Ohio. This factor may lead
to the development of a distinct mediation practice in Ohio.
(MODERATOR)
Thank you Howard for some very interesting challenges and in-
sights. Next, Rich Collins. Rich is the Director of the Institute for
Environmental Negotiation in Virginia.
(RICHARD COLLINS)
Mark Twain once said, "If I ever saw anyone coming down the
street that looked like he wanted to do me a favor, I'd turn around
and run the other way." I was in that role as a mediator: I could
do you a favor and help you find a solution. I could see a problem
and attempt to help. But people were skeptical; and, sometimes,
so was I.
Howard reminds me why we are named the Institute for En-
vironmental Negotiation, and although I now reluctantly accept
the term mediator, I do not accept the definition. I even toyed with
the idea that the word mediation not be used because I was not
sure of what it meant or if it would be useful in Virginia.
I believe that mediation is not the entry of a skilled, neutral third
party into an institutionalized conflict which is deadlocked. It is
the creative generation of a setting and the exploration of mutual
interests to the point at which those interests can become part of
a mutually acceptable agreement. Mediation occurs despite
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organized Bar opposition, scientific skepticism, bureaucratic con-
servatism, corporate calculation, political protectionism and en-
vironmental paranoia. The process succeeds because problems
need to be resolved.
The Institute exists in large part because the Foundation felt that
the idea of having something like mediation available in Virginia
was worth exploring. It was willing to put enough money on the
line to allow me, a professor in an academic department, to speak
with the President of the University and tell him why this organiza-
tion deserved a chance. Mediation is a public service that is likely
to be valuable. Mediation will not only help train graduate students,
but also will bring in support money for activities that are directly
germane to those who are involved in environmental planning and
policy analysis. Moreover, it is something that can be consistently
integrated with academic research and service functions. The Presi-
dent was persuaded to give the program a try, and I went to the
Foundation to request funding for three years.
I was skeptical then and I still remain skeptical and somewhat
surprised about the success of this organization. The individuals
involved were never formally trained in mediation; none knew
whether they ever wanted to train others. But we were fairly
familiar with the variety of today's substantive environmental
issues. We knew about bureaucracies and analysis. We were
familiar with litigation problems and the statutory basis for land
use and environmental regulations. So, in a sense, we were not
without some understanding of possible issues. But we became
mediators by a process of meeting, arguing, holding staff meetings
and asking a lot of questions. For instance, what are the ethical
limits of a mediator? How are the power implications worked out?
Also, we invited people whom we thought knew more than we did
to talk with us. We learned a great deal from them even though,
in many cases, we rejected what we knew was good advice.
But most of us were not interested in being part of the move-
ment to support alternative dispute resolution. In fact, I think that
mediation is a useful process, but is dominated by lawyers and is
too litigation-oriented. Environmental problems require policy in-
tervention as well as a concern for the use of scientific data and
bureaucratic turf problems. It is not like the classic labor media-
tion experience, which is heavily influenced by attorneys.
The goal of environmental mediation is dependent upon the
development of a sense of mutual interest between the various par-
ties and some hypothetical outcome that will be in the public in-
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terest. Parties need to get to know each other before determining
how substantial their disagreement is. They ought to know how
each perceives the situation before they go ahead. But the situa-
tion is influenced by regulations which govern their relationship.
Therefore, we asked ourselves if there was any role for us in the
governmental regulation development.
We asked: What kind of regulations does the state have? Does
the state apply the same regulation statewide? Whom does the state
bring into the regulation-creating process? Can we structure a
negotiation for regulation promulgation? The answer seemed to
be yes, we can. For instance, if a bottle bill were proposed, we would
bring together the bill's opponents and proponents, using data on
employment effects, recovery systems, etc. to permit intelligent
discussion.
Surprisingly, we encountered a number of difficulties even
though we were offering mediation cost-free. We had Foundation
grants and were not on anyone's payroll. We mediated as a public
service and informed clients that we had no financial needs.
Therefore, there was no self-interest or motivation to succeed at
all costs, although I sometimes felt like an engineer who wanted
to do a job satisfactorily.
We have, however, recently changed our original method of fund-
ing and now charge for our services. For example, we had a $90,000
contract with the state legislature to do a technical mediation on
how uranium mining might affect the health of Virginians. We also
had a number of urban design projects in the $10,000 category.
I believe that what we have been able to accomplish is due in
part to the fact that the Institute has expanded experimentally in
terms of concept and definition.
I also think that our "success" is based on the fact that we did
not go all over the country. We were not trying to establish a reputa-
tion. We were not developing written theory. We were dedicated
within the confines of Virginia to see if mediation could work. When
our experience showed that in many cases it could be valuable,
news of our success traveled by word of mouth to environmental
groups, corporations, and, most importantly, to government agen-
cies in which agency officials began to speak highly of the process.
To conclude, I would like to quote from a speech given in the
Province of Ontario which reflects a view different from ours:
While we remain vigilant in protection of Ontario's birthright, the environ-
ment, we are prepared to reform from experience the processes in our
regulatory framework. For instance, in some cases, mediation may be
more a sensible means of resolving disputes than existing administrative
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or judicial processes. Consequently, experimental mediation procedures
will be initiated within the Environment Assessment Board.
In other words, there exists in Ontario a policy direction that in-
volves mediation. We acknowledge it. But I suggest it should be
implemented experimentally. And then, as Mao Tse Tung in
another context once spoke, "let many flowers bloom."
(MODERATOR)
Thank you very much. I think we have heard some consistent
and diverse views. At this point Keith Hawkins is going to share
with us his perspective on his experience in England.
(KEITH HAWKINS)*
I. INTRODUCTION
I will present a short descriptive analysis of aspects of the en-
forcement of water pollution control regulations in England and
Wales. The presentation, drawn from a much larger study, 1 is in-
tended to suggest how various forms of informal dispute resolu-
tion processes may actually be embodied in the routine enforce-
ment of rules and regulations covering a wide area of behavior of
concern to the law.
In the enforcement of water pollution control laws in England
and Wales, disputes are most likely to occur in the process of set-
ting legally enforceable standards which determine what is or is
not a polluting effluent. At the enforcement stage, the dispute arises
when a field inspector, faced with what seems to be a polluting
discharge, is required to take remedial action against the polluter.
It is this latter stage which I shall address.
II. THE FORMAL ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES OF POLLUTION CONTROL
STANDARDS.
The broad legal structure and formal organization of water pollu-
tion control in England and Wales closely resembles the design
of similar regulatory institutions in America.2 In essence, the
*(Prof. Hawkins redrafted his presentation into article form. Footnotes for his
presentation are located at the end of the Symposium. E.)
1.K. HAWKINS. ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT-REGULATION AND THE SOCIAL
DEFINITION OF POLLUTION (1984). Many of the ideas presented in this paper
are drawn from the book.
2. See id., chapter 1, for a more detailed account of legal and administrative
provisions and practices.
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legislature defines the existence of a problem, creates an enforce-
ment bureaucracy to do something about the problem, and grants
it high levels of discretion to determine and enforce policy. In pro-
viding for the implementation of policy, the legislature equips the
regulatory bureaucracy with the power to invoke the criminal law,
thereby in some sense aligning the secular behavior of polluters
(behavior with technical, technological, and economic implications)
with more familiar forms of criminal behavior (prototypically harms
to person or property) addressed by the code of traditional criminal
law. However, one contrast with American regulatory practice is
that English regulatory agencies tend to be equipped with fewer
formal means of control. There is no array of intermediate formal
measures-consent decrees, cease and desist orders, civil fines-
which may precede or foreclose criminal proceedings in the United
States. In England the enforcement process is much simpler and
is organized ultimately around a binary choice for the enforcement
agent. Essentially the issue for an inspector faced with a pollution
is whether to prosecute. Note, however, that it is possible for a
regulatory agency to seek an injunction to restrain polluters from
undesirable activity, but this measure had never been employed
by the authorities with whom I worked.3
Although the criminal law is provided as the ultimate sanction
for violating the administratively determined pollution control stan-
dards, it is in fact very rarely used. Each of the ten water authorities
in England and Wales prosecutes only a handful of cases each year.
Indeed, one of the two agencies which were the subjects of my
research prided itself on being the toughest water authority in the
country, yet in two consecutive years in the late 1970s it sought
only twenty-one and eight prosecutions, respectively. 4 The other
authority researched prosecuted about three cases a year. Never-
theless, the enforcement agents (the corps of inspectors employed
by each authority to monitor and control pollution) still conceive
of their job as primarily one of enforcing the law. While it seems
odd that this view can be held in the face of such data, the matter
is dependent upon the essential conception of law enforcement to
which regulatory agents subscribe. In pollution control work the
dominant conception of law enforcement is one of attaining the
ends of the legislation by whatever means appropriate. In the tradi-
3. Threatening an injunction is a different matter, however, and is occasion-
ally employed in the informal processes of enforcement. Id. at 152.
4. Id. at 177.
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tional arena of criminal law, enforced by a uniformed and public
police, the conception of enforcement is one of punishing the breach
of a rule.
III. THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE STANDARD ENFORCER AND POLLUTER
A. The Polluter's Perspective
In this context by far the commonest setting for the existence
or potential for disputes arises at the stage at which an enforce-
ment agent seeks to implement the water pollution control stan-
dards. After all, the essence of regulatory enforcement, so far as
inspectors are concerned, is to get the subjects of regulation to do
what they do not want to do. Many industrialists and farmers tend
to regard pollution control regulations as an unnecessary and costly
burden upon their productive processes, a burden the impact of
which will be reflected in higher prices or lower profits. The dispute
in this arena of legal control arises from the fact that people are
being compelled by the criminal law to do what they do not want
to do either because they regard complying with social or economic
regulation as too costly, or because they regard such compliance
as unnecessary. For example, farmers believe they do not need to
change their time-honored practices by the dictates of an official
from a regulatory agency since they have been behaving in cer-
tain ways for years in disposing of waste. Some farmers and in-
dustrialists also tend not to accord legitimacy to a law that burdens
productive behavior which benefits the community in general. The
cost is not seen in narrow commerical terms, but as a more general
cost to the community, since goods become more expensive at
home and less competitive in the international marketplace. When
in principle the subjects of regulation accept the need for some
restraint, they may have a different conception of the kind or degree
of restraint which is required. These contrasting perspectives are
often crystallized and made real when a field inspector tries to im-
prove the quality of a polluting effluent or seeks to install preven-
tive works in order to forestall an accidental discharge.
B. The Field Inspector's Perspective
The field inspector, however, is interested in clean water. The
regulatory official works in an arena of social control in which com-
pliance tends not to reside in refraining from an act, but in carry-
ing out some positive action. Compliance costs the rule-breaker
310 [Vol. 1:2
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION IN OHIO
money. Therefore, the social skills of reasonableness, patience, and
persuasiveness are regarded among field staff as the supreme prac-
tical arts of the job because the exercise of these skills preempts
disputes.
Although field inspectors utilizing these skills witness com-
pliance with their requests, they believe polluters are, ironically,
deviant. As one experienced officer put it, "Everyone tries it on,
at least to begin with. Even the big firms who will do what we want
eventually. They will all say 'It wasn't us', or 'It was an accident. '"' 5
When I asked him how often polluters tried some form of decep-
tion, the officer replied:
Very regularly, very regularly. Nearly everyone to more or less a degree
will try to kid you about something. Either the nature of the cause of the
pollution, or how long it's been going on, or they 'weren't aware that there
was a pipe there,' or 'Is it really? I've never been down and looked at that
watercourse for the last 20 years. I didn't realize we were causing a prob-
lem.' But nearly everyone tries some minor deception... They will all
have a go... even the biggest companies where you're going to get the
perfect response, but they will still try to kid you that they 'weren't aware
that this was happening,' or 'it was while they were on leave' or, y'know,
they 'weren't doing it at all.'6
Note that this ritual "game" is played by "the biggest companies
where you're going to get the perfect response."7 With certain kinds
of polluters, however, the game is played in earnest and at greater
length.
IV. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY: INFLUENCES ON THE FIELD INSPECTOR'S
APPROACH
The broad characteristic of this game when played by the pollu-
tion control agent is enforcement of law by a strategy of compliance.
The precise nature of the enforcement process depends on the kind
of rule-breaking encountered and the kind of rule-breaker with
whom the agent must deal.
A. Characterization of the Standard Violation
Standard violation characterization is determined by what kind
of pollution the inspector must handle: implications differ depend-
ing on whether the inspectors are confronted with a "one-off' pollu-
tion as contrasted with a "persistent failure to comply." The former
is a term used to cover pollutions which are over and done with-
5. Id. at 118.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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a sudden discharge or a spillage, for example-while the latter
refers to pollutions which run episodically or continuously.
A one-off is a much more serious matter because it suggests the
possibility of a deliberate act; the sudden discharge may have been
the result of toxic liquid being spilt by accident in the factory yard,
or being flushed down the nearest drain to avoid paying several
hundred pounds to have it removed to a licensed disposal site.
The commonsense assumption with persistent failures to com-
ply, on the other hand, is that there is no serious intent to conceal
since the effluent is discharged regularly or continuously.
Therefore, cause will be important in characterizing the type of
rule-breaking which has occurred, for cause embodies the crucial
difference between an "accident" and a "deliberate act" and the
intermediate possibilities of various forms of indifference,
carelessness, or negligence.
B. Initial Characterization of the Polluter
Suggestions about the type of rule-breaking are also reflexively
connected with characterizations of the polluter, assuming that
the polluter can be detected. 8 The cause of a pollution will tell an
inspector something about the kind of person with whom he is deal-
ing. Equally, the kind of polluter encountered can provide ideas
about causation.
Polluters tend to be characterized in terms of polar opposites.
Thus, a polluter will be regarded as either "co-operative" or
"bolshie." These characterizations are derived from the perceived
responses of the polluter to the pollution and the field officer's ef-
forts at law enforcement, and form what is known of the polluter's
past relationships with the agency.
1. Polluter's Occupation
The picture which takes shape will often be embellished with
an inspector's views about the polluter's occupation. Certain oc-
8. Note that pollution, like many other forms of deviance, may be socially
organized to prevent or impede its discovery, thereby vastly decreasing
the likelihood that an offender will be detected. In addition, all water pollu-
tions are ephemeral forms of rule-breaking in the sense that evidence of
their existence dissipates with time, dilution, and the natural purifying
capacities of water courses. The quality of evanescence is more marked
with a one-off water pollution since it is increasingly severed from its point
of origin as the polluting slug drifts downstream. See Hawkins, Creating
Cases in a Regulatory Agency, 12 URB. LIFE 371 (1984).
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cupations or industries are regarded as particularly suspect and
disreputable. One suspect category is the industry in which the
costs of compliance give companies much greater incentive to ig-
nore or evade pollution control regulations. One such industry is
metal plating, for its pollution control costs are a very significant
part of total manufacturing costs. People in other kinds of occupa-
tions are considered more likely to impugn the legitimacy of the
officer and the pollution control agency; farmers and 'fly-by-night'
industrialists who are 'here today, gone tomorrow' are typical ex-
amples of those who symbolically reject the agency's authority by
egregious noncompliance.
C. Temporal Aspect of the Pollution Encountered
The enforcement strategy adopted is not only influenced by the
character of the standard violation and polluter, but is also depen-
dent upon the temporal aspect of the pollution encountered. Some
pollutions can be stopped when the enforcement agent arrives on
the scene, but other types occur over a period of time. Time, work
and money are necessary to cure this type of pollution because
the cure will almost always consist of the installation of new or
improved pollution control equipment, or the physical redesign
of existing treatment or manufacturing processes. Enforcement
agents recognize that such work cannot be attempted with im-
mediate effect. But, once a measure of compliance has been
attained, it must be continuously maintained by the inspector by
means of routine monitoring-inspection and sampling on a regular
basis-and in this sense compliance has a quality of endlessness.
D. Signs of Compliance with Enforcement Strategy
However, to talk in these terms is to conceive of compliance as
a state. It is more helpful to view compliance as a process, since
in the enforcement of pollution control regulations certain signs
of compliance have a central importance. These signs may con-
sist of some physical changes in treatment capabilities or im-
provements in the quality of the effluent. But of particular impor-
tance are the perceived intentions of the polluter. Thus, a polluter
may be regarded as "compliant," even though dirty water con-
tinues to be discharged, because the polluter is able to persuade
the inspector that its intention to comply is honorable. This dual
impression of a polluter who is compliant in spirit if not in action
may continue for a substantial period of time. Indeed, it may take
months or years of patient bargaining to get the polluter to do what
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the field officer ultimately wants.
1. Attitude of Polluter
The response of the rule-breaker to the enforcement process is
treated as a matter of considerable significance. One of the impor-
tant signs of compliance which is central to the evaluation of the
rule-breaker's response is the polluter's "attitude." Attitude is as
important as actions taken by the polluter:
I think that's the most important thing, is his attitude. Because the pollu-
tions themselves can be so variable ... If he's trying to solve it, I go along
with him. If he's not interested in it and thinks 'Well, it will go away in
time anyway' then obviously I'm going to press him harder then. Yeah,
it is the most single important parameter I think, his attitude. 9
The continuing attitude of the polluter suggests the degree to
which pollution control work is being taken seriously, if at all, and
indicates to what extent the field officer is being reasonable in his
demands and legitimate in his expectations.
E. Reasonableness of Field Inspector
The enforcement strategy adopted will also be characterized by
the officer's concern with being "reasonable." Reasonableness is
a major occupational imperative of the pollution control officer,
stipulating a need to be neither too strict in the demands made
of the polluter nor too impatient with the polluter's progress. To
be too hard, unreasonable or impatient with the polluter risks delay,
evasiveness and continued noncompliance.
F. Deterrence Possibilities
Should being reasonable prove ineffective, however, pollution
control inspectors may turn to an alternative approach. Another
dimension in the process of settling differences is deterrence. In-
spectors assume that polluters may be amenable to threats in the
course of the enforcement relationship. This deterrence resides not
in the penalty which may ultimately be announced by a court upon
a successful prosecution, but in the ramifications of being asso-
ciated with the formal process of prosecution and trial.
Pollution control officers believe that companies do have certain
incentives to avoid the taint of being involved in the formal pro-
cesses of the law. They may be commercial incentives such as the
9. HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 109.
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desire to protect the reputation of the finm. Another less apparent,
but nevertheless weighty incentive, is the desire of companies to
maintain good relationships with other regulatory agencies which
may have important benefits to confer. And, of course, it is also
important for individuals in companies to protect their own posi-
tions against sanctions from within the company following a pollu-
tion for which they are held personally responsible.
V. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY: BARGAINING AS THE CENTRAL
CHARACTERISTIC
In all cases the central characteristic of the enforcement process
is settling differences by bargaining. Enforcement agents bargain
because it implies a degree of consensus from the other side. In
arriving at a bargain, the polluter offers goodwill, cooperation and
ultimate compliance, while the enforcement agent offers free in-
formation and advice on pollution control techniques and, most
importantly, forbearance. The enforcement agent forbears from
enforcing the law to the extent theoretically possible. Indeed,
bargaining is possible because the law need not be formally enforced:
instead of leaving the impression that you're some jump-up little upstart
from an office using the law to tell him what he must do, if you talk to
him right, you finish up leaving him with the view that 'Well, he's a damn
good chap ... I could've been prosecuted for this. I'm breaking the law,
but he's obviously going to shoot it under the carpet and let me get away
with it.' So ... he does what he has to do, with goodwill, and every-
body's happy.10
A. The Process of Bargaining
Given the ritual moves in the game which are routinely expected
by enforcement officials, this process of enforcing the law by settling
differences is not usually achieved immediately. Instead, arriving at
an acceptable solution takes time and possibly several visits from the
field officer. In order to get the pollutor to do what the officer would
like to be done, an array of negotiating tactics will be employed serially,
depending on the polluter's response and the seriousness of the prob-
lem. These tactics develop from lenient, patient moves to more drastic
measures. This approach, which seems characteristic of much
regulatory enforcement was well described by Rock in a study of
debt enforcement as the application of increments of increasing
unpleasantness."
10. Id. at 123.
11. P. RocK, MAKING PEOPLE PAY 65 (1973).
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In some cases the process may be compressed and the number of
steps employed will be reduced. For instance, a serious pollution may
be handled straightaway with the drama of taking a legal sample,
which serves as the formal collection of incriminating evidence ad-
missible in a prosecution in court.
1. Steps Taken by the Standard Enforcer
Such cases are relatively rare, however, and the typical approach
begins with the enforcement agent informally requesting certain
action to be taken by the Polluter. This request may be reinforced by
a formal letter sent from headquarters and, if necessary, the involve-
ment of the officer's immediate superior. If these moves do not pro-
duce any sign of the desired response, the officer will engage in firmer
action. Instead of requests, demands will be made; warnings or threats
may be issued; finally, a legal sample may be drawn, a move which
is both practical and symbolic, for it is intended to underline the
gravity of the polluter's position as well as to collect evidence. A formal
sample may be followed by issuance of a Notice of Intention to Com-
mence Proceedings, which is the final step before prosecution. Through-
out this process formal legal proceedings are presented as the ultimate
and logical consequence for the continued noncompliance of the
polluter.
Efforts at resolving the problem will be pursued by the enforce-
ment agent throughout this process, even as the dispute deepens
and more weighty enforcement moves are made. These moves
must be carefully handled by the officer to avoid prolonging or ex-
acerbating the dispute. For example, the polluter who remains
flatly obstinate may discover that the field officer's powers are not
quite as severe or as readily used as might have been suggested.
This situation creates for the officer a problem of preserving his
credibility as an enforcement agent. However, the enforcement
agent must depict the coming of the formal legal process as inex-
orable and an unpleasant fate to be avoided at all costs.
In the course of seeking to resolve their differences, both parties
often engage in a continual redrawing of the lines. The pollution
control officer will adjust his tactics in light of his interpretation
of the discharger's behavior and degree of compliance, while the
polluter will adapt to the changing demands being placed on him
by the officer. The nature and shape of this form of disputing pro-
cess are molded by such reciprocal interpretations.
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VI. LAST RESORT: PROSECUTION AS A SELECTIVE PROCESS OF
STANDARD ENFORCEMENT
A. Why Few Pollutions are Prosecuted
Few disputes are crystallized in the form of prosecution for
several reasons. First, in this branch of regulatory enforcement,
prosecution is treated as a public act, a means by which a
regulatory agency can dramatize that it is doing something for the
public. Yet there is also a notable political dimension in regula-
tion. Agencies find themselves continually caught between their
competing publics. "Business" or "laissez-faire" constituencies
regard regulatory control as an unnecessary burden to be either
eliminated or reduced. However, "activist" or "pro-regulation" con-
stituencies want to see regulatory law toughened and more strict-
ly enforced by agencies. This fundamental conflict of view is handl-
ed by agencies by displaying action to placate their activist publics
by showing that they are doing something, but not too much so
as to arouse the hostility of their business public. As a senior of-
ficial said, "the big risk on publicity [of prosecutions] is that [reg-
ulatory agencies] will be castigated in the press as the big heartless
bureaucracy victimizing the private citizen.' 1 2
Second, most pollutions are too insignificant to be worth drama-
tizing by prosecution. Also, the business constituency is likely to
be outraged at the use of public resources in trivial cases. One work-
ing rule for regulatory agencies contemplating prosecution is to
avoid prosecuting minor cases.
Third, agencies and polluters have a mutual interest in the suc-
cessful resolution of differences between them which avoids for-
mally enforcing the law. Moral and technical impediments to using
the formal machinery of prosecution to secure compliance create
a working presumption against the formal use of law, replacing
it with an imperative to handle matters informally.
B. Which Pollutions will be Prosecuted?
These influences all conspire to produce a very sparing use of
formal proceedings. To use prosecution more frequently would
violate the injunction to be reasonable. But what determines which
cases are selected for prosecution? Pressure exerted to display the
credibility of the regulatory agency as a legal enforcement authority
12. HAWKINS. supra note 1, at 205-06.
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by prosecuting some cases, however few, results in an interest in
prosecuting the egregious and persistent failure to comply for deter-
rent purposes. Prosecution not only shows that the agency means
business, but also symbolizes disapproval of willful persistence in
noncompliance. Also important is the occasional use of prosecu-
tion to mark newsworthy cases or cases which otherwise cause
grave harm. This enforcement also displays the enforcement ac-
tivity of the agency. These are the "big" cases which may occa-
sionally take advantage of the framing of the law in strict liability
terms.
Much more frequently encountered, however, are blameworthy
cases which are morally disreputable either because of the per-
sistence of the law-breaking, or its maliciousness or calculation.
In such a case the organizational rule is to prosecute because the
offender deserves prosecution. Ambivalence toward prosecution
is absent because what is being sanctioned is the deliberate, neg-
ligent, or persistent behavior, and not the pollution itself. In behav-
ing in this way, agencies are employing a framework recognizable
to both its publics. The activist public will expect action as a matter
of course, but in sanctioning misconduct recognizable to the laissez-
faire public an agency is avoiding the complaint of vindictiveness.
It is prosecuting, and thereby punishing, the "bad" case. In an en-
vironment of ambivalence, what is mutually recognizable is of
immense significance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Thus, in the enforcement of water pollution control laws, disputes
arise and are foreclosed or resolved by the enforcement agent's
practical arts of reasonableness and patience. Should the polluter
fail to live up to his side of the implied bargain, however, pressure
will gradually be applied to persuade or coerce him to something
which can pass as compliance. The extent to which demands will
be made and pushed through will depend upon the officer's sense
of the polluter's willingness and ability to comply. In other words,
justice is accomplished in compliance strategy in the process of
negotiation. In contrast, justice is accomplished when someone
is let off when law is enforced by the police. 13
In pollution control work, the failure to negotiate a resolution
by enforcement agent and polluter is signaled by resort to formal
13. See RIESS AND BORDUS. Environment and Organization: A Perspective on
the Police, in THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS (D. Bordua ed. 1967).
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proceedings. Reluctance to prosecute is inherent in the enforce-
ment moves preceding prosecution as a result of pragmatic con-
cerns about getting the job done in the best and most efficient way,
and moral concerns about what it is right and proper to do. The
pressure does not come from lack of resources to prosecute (one
of the agencies researched made an annual profit of twenty-seven
million pounds in the second year of the fieldwork), nor from the
pressure of cases with which to be dealt. That prosecution is a very
rare event suggests the degree to which field level enforcement
agents are able to resolve disputes in their everyday work.
(MODERATOR)
Thank you very much. I think it is an interesting reminder that
already there is a good deal of dispute resolution in the environ-
mental field in the areas of enforcement, standard setting and
development of legislation. At this point, I ask Jenny Aveny to re-
spond with some of her comments and thoughts about what, if
anything, should be done in Ohio.
(VIRGINIA AVENY)
The Ohio EPA is beginning to stage dispute resolution. The
agency has requested a budget allocation of $50,000 for the 1986-
1987 fiscal year to begin promoting dispute resolution outside of
the regulatory framework of the agency. An opportunity exists to
introduce people who are in the environmental protection area to
independent mediation on those issues that cannot be resolved in
the regulatory program.
A major issue is the capacity to deal with the unbalanced power
level of the disputants. The power levels need to be balanced before
adequate dispute resolution or mediation can be implemented.
Some communities may not receive benefits from mediation equal
to the negative environmental impact that they incur. In areas
where waste materials are stored, treated or disposed, the issue
exists of whether the community is getting any benefit from media-
tion. The EPA, of course, does not have the capability of dealing
with that kind of issue. So the EPA is trying to identify to where
it can refer people for mediation, and how it can develop a frame-
work for establishing that the mediators are neutral persons.
The agency's role, however, does not involve developing dispute
resolution, although the agency does engage in the same kinds of
negotiations as those described by Keith Hawkins. For instance,
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the agency engages in steps such as requests for compliance, in-
itiation of a compliance schedule, and filing litigation.
Standard setting is very important in the agency; it must be the
highest attainable or the job is not being done. Mediation may im-
pinge on standard setting at the compliance or settlement stage
by trading present results for future standard integrity. For exam-
ple, a toxic dispute in which the risks are not known may result
in mediation achieving an outcome that is later unacceptable under
adopted standards.
Pete Clapham from the Hazardous Wastes Facility Board has
been working with the agency to help identify those points in the
siting of hazardous waste facilities that may best lend themselves
to mediation. David Hartley may want to talk more about how the
new legislation will bring people into the siting process.
(DAVID HARTLEY)
I have a problem believing that people are going to negotiate
when they have a reason to negotiate. The people that believe in
NIMBY (not in my back yard) are generally the people who are in-
volved in the major cases. They are not willing to negotiate.
The area in which I have worked is negotiating legislation such
as the Hazardous Waste bill and the regulation of salt brine. Now
I am negotiating a ground water bill. I will not use the term media-
tion or negotiations, but for the Hazardous Waste bill a carrot and
stick approach was used to get the interested parties to sit down
at the table. The Chamber of Commerce needed better procedures
in the hazardous waste area. They also needed me to avoid harass-
ing them by trying to sneak bills wherever I could or put bills into
other bills. So the Chamber of Commerce agreed to negotiate with
the Sierra Club, Environmental Council, and the Audubon Society.
Eventually we agreed on 85% of the bill. For two months nothing
moved, and progress did not seem likely. I was frustrated, and so
I chose a person to act as mediator. I asked the Sierra Club, the
Ohio Manufacturer's Association, the Audubon Society and all the
people involved whether they would be willing to accept the medi-
ator I had chosen. Then I contacted the mediator and asked him
to mediate the remaining 15 % of the bill, which he did successfully.
We came up with a bill with which not everybody was happy or
unhappy. The bill was acceptable because the parties were willing
to negotiate.
Presently, I am working on a ground water bill. And we are sitting
down about once a month with as many parties as possible to
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negotiate a bill. I think we are making progress. But this is a dif-
ferent area from what the other speakers have discussed. I think
more success can be achieved in bill negotiation than in individual
dispute resolution.
(PETER PROCARIO)
My background is as an attorney and environmentalist. I spent
several years as an attorney for the EPA. I have represented a
number of individuals in front of the EPA. I have taken a number
of environmental cases to court: litigated some, settled some,
negotiated some, possibly even mediated some. And I have repre-
sented citizen groups and small industries before the EPA. So I
tend to think that I have seen all sides of what happens in environ-
mental disputes as they arise in front of the EPA.
I am concerned about mediation. I think that to a certain extent
mediation, like motherhood, is easy to espouse but difficult to define
on a case-by-case basis. I think this is the main concern I have with
the process in Ohio. I am not opposed to mediation. In fact, I con-
sider myself to be a firm believer in mediation. But I am not sure
what mediation is. Nor am I certain of its usefulness in Ohio.
Ohio is an adversarial state regarding environmental issues. The
entire process of permit issuance, enforcement actions, and citizen
actions are predicated on an adversary system. Someone brings
a problem to the attention of a party or an agency. That party or
agency is asked to resolve the problem. Some of those issues lend
themselves very well to mediation and negotiation. Many of them
do not.
I think another unfortunate part of the Ohio system is that a great
number of property rights rest upon environmental regulation. As
a general rule, I think those issues have been the most difficult
to negotiate because they do not easily lend themselves to media-
tion. It is very difficult to mediate property rights.
Another problem is the difficulty of identifying who the parties
are in a given case. In any mediated or negotiated situation in which
I have been involved, the successfully settled disputes have been
disputes in which the parties are easily identified. However, I
believe that all parties to or interests in a mediation are not repre-
sented by the parties that are present. As a general rule: when an
issue arises the people or the interests that attend the hearing are
those that are either funded or have been able to organize. I never
presume that the groups in attendance represent all of the public
interests.
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I have difficulty defining mediation. Depending on how media-
tion is defined, I am either totally in favor of it or totally opposed
to it. I am limiting my comments to the mediation of environmental
issues in Ohio under the present circumstances. I believe that
mediation is a valuable and useful resolution technique for many
disputes. But it certainly is not going to solve all environmental
problems. Some of the examples we have discussed are issues that
lend themselves to mediation. But such issues as where to locate
a landfill are not amenable to mediation.
Finally, I think that mandated mediation in the current Ohio
setting is a questionable dispute resolution technique. The only
successful mediation is mediation that is voluntarily entered into
by the interested parties. So, if Ohio law were amended to allow
or require mediation within forty days of X event, another legal
step in the process will have been created that will never be rid
of lawyers. I think that this type of mandated mediation, or forced
mediation, is not mediation. I am not opposed to mediation because
mediation is inevitable and appropriate in certain situations. For
instance, I participated in a case that, at least on an ad hoc basis,
created a mediation by its own terms without having an outside
mediator. But that kind of situation is rare.
I am a firm believer in mediation, but I have qualms about its
operation. Before jumping on the environmental mediation band-
wagon in the current Ohio context there must be an examination
of the whole license and permit granting structure in the state
of Ohio.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SYMPOSIUM
(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER)
I would like to say one thing. I think that Peter's comments on
the ambiguity of the meaning and applicability of mediation are
important. I think that mediation should not be viewed as an alter-
native to the law or applicable enforcement procedures. It should
be employed in conjunction with the statutory responsibilities of
an agency required to make policy and final decisions. This is what
I term mediation in the classical sense. But when mediation alone
is the basis for the agency's policies and regulations, mediation
becomes consultative and involves the public in a different way
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then does classic mediation. This is not mediation in the classical
sense.
(VIRGINIA AVENY)
I would like to respond. The approach the agency is taking is
not to consider mediation its role. The agency does take advan-
tage of and is trying to expand its opportunities to employ dispute
resolution in the permit granting process. For example, the agency
encourages citizens to provide input regarding appropriate terms
and conditions of a permit. This input may help set standards.
But the requirement of timeliness in the enforcement procedure
does not lend itself to this type of mediation. The agency may issue
three or four letters based on field investigations that have un-
covered violations before it is ready to initiate an enforcement
action. The predictability, consistency and timeliness of this pro-
cedure are characteristics the agency is attempting to improve
because they are the foundations of a solid regulatory program.
To allow delays at certain stages by mediating an issue may result
in a negative impact on a predictable regulatory program.
However, the agency is still looking to the dispute resolution pro-
cess to handle issues that are outside the regulatory framework.
For instance, mediation may be beneficial when a facility has a
poor reputation or when manufacturing processes exist that are
alarming to people.
(HOWARD BELLMAN)
Let me comment on the reference to power leveling as a condi-
tion precedent to mediation. I think that was the phrase, power
leveling, and I know what you mean because it is in every dis-
cussion on the subject. I will tell you that if you wait for power level-
ing you are waiting in a vacuum. Power leveling is a theoretical
possibility that is useful in theoretical discussions. But society will
not provide you with an equilibrium of power. I have spent my life
as a mediator and have never seen an equilibrium of power. The
lion's share will go to the lion when the mediation is finished. This
is important to say to prevent mediation from over-promising
results.
Promising the world through mediation is underscored by a
general repugnance toward conflict. There is a sense that conflict
is bad. I do not believe that, but certain people believe that con-
flict should be avoided whenever and wherever.
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However, when you promise to limit, or anticipate and avoid,
conflict, you become seductive because this approach appeals to
people. You end up putting skilled people who could not be con-
sidered mediators into a community in which conflict is threaten-
ing. They manage to avoid the conflict by becoming involved in
the problem at such an early stage that they bring about a resolu-
tion before those who would oppose it have an opportunity to
organize. These "mediators" do in fact avoid conflict by getting
the ostensibly interested parties at the table. The mediation looks
benign. In reality, however, you avoid conflict by favoring those
whose actions might generate opposition.
For example, if someone wants to build a mine in downtown Co-
lumbus that person gets people to meet soon after the proposal
for the mine, and thus avoid any opposition. Those who want to
build the mine will be favored.
What I think is particularly perverse about this type of result is
that the body politic is responsive to what is termed "economic
development," and economic development can be promoted by
conflict avoidance. Conflict will resist development. And so you
can send people in early to subvert the possibility of organized con-
flict which might serve the community. That is why you must put
a fine point on some of these mediation processes.
(MEMBER OF AUDIENCE)
What is the practical definition we need to adopt to avoid the
potential "evil" or "wrong" in the premature settlement of an issue
of potential conflict?
(HOWARD BELLMAN)
The practical definition lies in a passive role for the mediator.
It lies in what I consider neutrality because an aggressive role for
both the mediator and the process permits persuading people who
are not ready for the process into engaging in the process.
The aggressive mediator says, "I know you are not organized
yet, but why not get started? The other party might have something
good to offer you." Of course, the mediator does not say that after
you are organized the other party may have to offer you a hell of
a lot more.
And so I think that we try to market this process because we
believe in it. But when you chase specific ambulances there is a
possibility of an overly-aggressive approach which is not neutral
because it favors those who are ready to negotiate.
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(MODERATOR)
It seems to me that the biggest hurdle in mediation is getting
people to come to the table. People do not understand to what they
are submitting. They have to understand the definition of media-
tion. Part of that definition is formulated before negotiations are
entered: it is created in the ground rules that are established to
determine how the parties are going to proceed in the negotiations.
In some of the processes in which I have been involved the stage
at which it was "go" or "no go" was in the ground rules. A lot of
the battle is over once you get people to understand why they are
negotiating and what is their job. So this is a very important con-
sideration. Be honest in mediation so the parties can believe that
they will not be coerced or co-opted.
(PETER PROCARIO)
I think it is very easy for mediation to become an example of the
failure of government rather than an improvement of government,
or at least something of which the government can be proud. By
favoring mediation as an end to all disputes you have adopted a
pro-development stance, or depending on the context, you have
set the stage for promoting what you think you are merely
facilitating or mediating.
I am also concerned that by negotiating before a dispute exists
or before an issue exists for which sides can form and all interests
develop, true voluntary mediation has not occurred because
something was excluded that needed to be considered. So I think
it is very easy for mediation to represent a failure of government
to regulate and decide tough issues. It could be a convenient
method by which regulatory agencies can put off deciding a con-
troversial or difficult issue.
(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER)
I have no illusions about the fact that a mediator cannot mediate
unless skilled adversaries are present. It is not adversarialism that
we are trying to eliminate; rather, we are trying to make adver-
sarialism more useful when two people want to swing at each other.
But the term mediator irritates me. It means some person is mak-
ing sure people do not become angry at each other. Call me
something other than a mediator because I am not interested in
trying to bring premature agreement on an issue. But when a law
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states that environmental impact evaluations should be conducted
in advance of a project, we are supposed to worry about what the
long-term effects will be. And yet no one knows that the party in-
terested in the project is coming down the street. In this situation
which mediator is helping somebody: the person who says "Look
out, it's coming," or the person who says "Wait until it's right in
your front yard and then fight?" If you do not look ahead, you are
going to end up with a deadlock which has no way out other than
social conflict.
I am talking about mediation within the context of the law and
not whether we can get two people together. I am involved in this
type of process, and I do not think a mediator has to be a passive,
bland, neutral, gray suit type. If that is what mediation must be,
then it is clearly wrong.
(MEMBER OF AUDIENCE)
Ohio has an example of both mediation and negotiation in the
procedures employed by the Ohio Water Commission. The basic
agencies involved with issues concerning surface water, ground
water, and related land were represented on this commission.
This commission was created in 1959 after Ohio experienced a
drought in the mid-50's and began a regional water planning pro-
cess. It was terminated in 1972.
The Commission gave recommendations on water policy. The
Commission would conduct hearings around the state during
which potential problems regarding water use were voiced. I am
familiar with hearings held in Akron and Dayton. The Akron hear-
ing concerned surface water allocation and the Dayton hearing,
ground water allocation. The Commission's recommendations did
not have the effect of law but were implemented because they were
so well-respected. I think that is mediation and negotiation. If we
consider something new to implement in Ohio we should look at
this commission's history.
(UNIDENTIFED SPEAKER)
I hesitate to say the history of water development in Ohio
involved mediation. The large part of the process up to 1972 was
basically the kind of process that Keith discussed earlier, which
involved negotiating, arm twisting and letter writing. I hesitate to
call that "mediation."
This process characterized and represented the total inability
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of the state to enforce regulations that benefited the environment.
As a result of that failure EPA-type legislation, the NPDS permit
system, and air regulatory systems were introduced. These pieces
of legislation were in reaction to the failure of informal negotiated
enforcement. The regulations prior to this legislation were not
stringent and the enforcement and compliance schedules were
negotiable. For instance, engineers would talk to Republic Steel
in Cleveland and would work out a seven year program. When the
program did not work it would be extended an additional two years.
So part of Ohio's environmental regulatory laws is a result of the
failure of the informal system mentioned.
(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER)
The process in which the Ohio Water Commission engaged seems
to be a public hearing process. People testified and their testimony
seemed to be influential. I think that summarizes what you were
saying. A formal record was kept and you can see some correla-
tion between what went in and what came out. But there were
many influences on the Commission which shaped its final
recommendations.
(MEMBER OF AUDIENCE)
It seems that Ohio should not become involved in mediation at
this point because it would sell environmentalism down the drain.
Negotiation and mediation do not work unless one side has the
power or the ability to make the other side realize that mediation
or negotiation is to their advantage.
Also, I do not know if it is even wise to contemplate environmen-
tal mediation unless you know which parties should be involved
in the mediation.
(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER)
Let us look at environmental dispute resolution differently for
a moment. Let us not use the phrase environmental mediation.
Let us look at the ability to develop policy, rules and regulation,
and the ability to enforce these rules in the area in which the en-
vironment is involved. Are not politics in the legislature and litiga-
tion in the courts forms of conflict resolution, part of a process of
public discourse and regulation? All are part of a common societal
process which tries to determine how environmental values and
concerns can be established in society. I think that mediation is
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a fragile, helpful, weak effort to resolve conflicts which arise in this
process.
(RICHARD COLLINS)
I think it is appropriate that you are skeptical consumers of
mediation. You must avoid being seduced. But I am concerned
when you say that mediation at this point in time will sell en-
vironmentalism down the drain. The response to that concern is
to consider whether negotiation would be useful in appropriate
cases. For example, can a mediator clarify the issue in a particular
case?
I would like to go back to the example of the Water Commission
and the role of government officials in what is called mediation.
I am concerned about broadening the term mediation to include
a lot of things which are more appropriately called exercises of
managerial skill. Mediation requires impartiality and neutrality.
It assumes a process by which the decision is made on the basis
of the mutual agreement of the interested parties, and not the in-
tervention of a powerful third party like a government official. A
third party could result in two against one. Therefore, a mediator
must avoid engaging in behavior which suggests that he or she
sympathizes with one side. Neutrality becomes difficult to main-
tain when more than two parties are involved in the mediation.
The mediator must understand that the parties' relative power,
influence, and persuasiveness are going to decide how the dispute
will be resolved, and not what the mediator's personal views are.
In addition to a selective approach to the application of media-
tion to environmental disputes, let me point out something which
is not so obvious. If you become involved in these disputes, even
though you might be disappointed in the outcome, you become
important because you were involved in them. And if you become
important you become powerful. But you are being invited into
a cycle which requires rationalizing less than acceptable outcomes.
You rationalize to get where you must be. That is life in politics.
You cannot live outside of politics and be influential in government.
If you withdraw from this cycle of involvement and power because
you feel you are not ready you will not play a role in shaping en-
vironmental policy. So an invitation has been extended to shape
policy, but it requires justifying certain outcomes to disputes to
which you were a party.
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I would like to suggest an area of environmental dispute resolu-
tion in Ohio in which mediation may be useful. The law concern-
ing hazardous waste site selection requires a series of public and
adjudicatory hearings which must be conducted at certain points
in time. This powerful regulatory process, specified by law,
reasonably assures us that the environment will be no worse off
than it would be in the absence of mediation. The law as written
allows mediation to be conducted if the parties can organize
themselves to so do.
A problem with the law specifying the siting process is that there
is so little experience on what the law means. Having been involved
with a siting proceeding, I read those deadlines to be stringent in
requiring the identification of parties and the time period by which
a party should have intervened.
This process points out the problem of identifying the proper par-
ties which should be involved in mediation. The law provides for
a number of different classes of people to intervene. It mandates
certain categories of people to be parties to a proceeding. For in-
stance, the law dictates that county commissioners are parties in
certain cases. If a citizens group wants to intervene in the process
or be part of the mediation, should it be allowed to mediate when
theoretically it is represented by the county commissioners? Or
assume that during the siting process the time period has run
within which a group can intervene. Should it be allowed to par-
ticipate in a negotiated, mediated situation? Legally, such groups
are not parties anymore. How do they fit into the process?
If a party can win in this process by strict adherence to the law,
then it will resist mediating any issue raised during the pro-
ceedings. On the other hand, if a party is going to lose on legal
grounds, what issues can be mediated becomes a relevant part of
the way the case is handled.
The issues that are negotiable are basically compensatory in
nature. In this situation the EPA will have already decided that
a hazardous waste site is appropriate. Therefore, a dispute has been
created, but the only issue now open to negotiation is how to com-
pensate those individuals surrounding the site.
(VIRGINIA AVENY)
That is not true. A chemical company's storage facility in Co-
lumbus was considered by a number of people to require more in-
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spections. These people presented this issue in the public hearing
process. These people were not part of the adjudicatory process.
(PETER PROCARIO)
I consider that type of issue presentation as compensatory in the
sense that what is no longer negotiable is should that facility be
there. I agree that the issue you mentioned is negotiable.
(RICHARD COLLINS)
Your examples indicate that the mediation process is not a way
to stop something from happening. Those who desire no change
should avoid the process. What mediation involves is the details
of change, and not the fact of change. For example, the traditional
role of mediation in labor disputes is a process generally favored
by those who want changes in wages, hours and working condi-
tions. I want more money. I am having a hard time getting it. Let's
get a mediator in here. The process, therefore, favors change and
to this extent it is a powerful tool.
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